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Abstract This paper explores the epistemology and moral psychology of
“therapeutic trust,” in which one trusts with the aim of inspiring greater trustresponsiveness in the trusted. Theorists have appealed to alleged cases of rational therapeutic trust to show that trust can be adopted for broadly moral or
practical reasons and to motivate accounts of trust that do not involve belief
or confidence in someone’s trustworthiness. Some conclude from the cases that
trust consists in having normative expectations and adopting vulnerabilities
with respect to the trusted; others that trust involves accepting (without necessarily believing) that someone will prove trustworthy. Although there are, I
argue, some genuine cases of rational therapeutic trust, some prominent examples confuse trusting with entrusting and are actually counterexamples to
the adopted vulnerabilities and acceptance accounts they have been taken to
support. An alternative account, which construes trust in terms of being confident enough to take salient risks on someone’s trustworthiness, makes better
sense of therapeutic trust.

1 Introduction
In a famous scene from Les Misérables, Bishop Myriel gives Jean Valjean a
valuable set of silver that Valjean has been caught stealing, trusting him to
use the gift to become an honest man. Although Valjean is not, at that time,
the sort of person for whom such trust is warranted, Bishop Myriel’s trust
inspires him to become the sort of person who is. The scene depicts the way
that trust in others can inspire dramatic moral transformations. Powerful nonfiction cases are fairly easy to come by. Consider, for example, the way leaders
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of non-violent resistance movements, such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King,
Jr., trusted their followers to be capable of acts of extreme self-sacrifice, and
thereby inspired them to live up to the high expectations embodied in their
trust. I suspect many readers can think of personal stories in the same key,
when the trust of a parent, teacher, or mentor has inspired them to become
the sort of person worthy of the trust given to them.
That trust sometimes inspires greater trustworthiness is uncontroversial.
More controversially, some philosophers have suggested that there are rational
cases of “therapeutic trust,” in which one trusts with the explicit aim of inspiring trustworthiness—harnessing, as reasons for trust, considerations about
how one’s own trust might inspire greater trust-responsiveness. Karen Jones
suggests the following oft-cited example:
[A] mother might trust her teenage daughter to look after the house for
the weekend even though the daughter has failed in the past to meet
such responsibilities with trustworthiness. The mother might think that
by displaying her trust and not arranging to have the daughter stay at
a friend’s house or to have the neighbors keep an eye on the place, she
can elicit trust-responsiveness in her daughter. The mother might lack
confidence that the daughter will respond to trust with trustworthiness
on this occasion, but she hopes that, eventually, her trust will be repaid
with trustworthiness. [Jones, 2004, 16]
In Jones’ description, the mother trusts the daughter with the house for the
weekend because she wants to encourage her to become more trustworthy;
her reasons for trust include the thought that trusting the daughter with the
house will potentially inspire her to become more trustworthy in the long term
(though probably not this weekend).
More generally, we can stipulate that a case of therapeutic trust is any
case in which something akin to the following “therapeutic thought” serves as
a reason for trust:
Therapeutic Thought: If I were to trust S to φ, then my trust would
likely inspire S to be more trust-responsive.
A second proposed example of therapeutic trust comes from Richard Holton:
Suppose you run a small shop. And suppose you discover that the person you have recently employed has just been convicted of petty theft.
Should you trust him with the till? It appears that you can really decide whether or not to do so. And again it appears that you can do so
without believing that he is trustworthy. [Holton, 1994, 63]
Holton suggests that you could decide to trust the employee with the till
because you think that your trust will be morally beneficial for the employee,
encouraging or inspiring him to be more trust-responsive.1
1 I follow Karen Frost-Arnold [2014] in interpreting this example as a case of therapeutic
trust, although the motivations Holton suggests the shopowner might have for trusting do
not obviously involve inspiring trustworthiness. He suggests the shopowner might trust in
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Although Victor Hugo does not describe Bishop Myriel’s reasons for trusting Jean Valjean in much detail, we can construct a third potential case of
therapeutic trust by adding to the story that Bishop Myriel trusted Valjean,
at least in part, because he predicted the inspirational effects his trust would
likely have on Valjean.
The aim of this paper is to explore the epistemology and moral psychology
of therapeutic trust, and to consider what the phenomenon has to teach about
the nature and rationality of trust. Theorists such as Jones and Holton have
appealed to the examples above as intuitively clear cases in which trust is
rationally adopted for practical or moral reasons. So construed, the cases seem
to be counterexamples to a prominent “evidence-only” view about reasons for
trust, according to which only evidence of someone’s present trustworthiness
can properly serve as a reason for trusting them. However, as we shall see,
making sense of rational therapeutic trust is more difficult than is sometimes
thought, and we should not presuppose that all of the examples just given can
ultimately be understood as genuine cases of rational trust.
The discussion will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I clarify the concept
of interpersonal trust at issue and distinguish it from acts of entrusting with
which it is easily confused. Section 3 presents what I take to be the strongest
arguments for the view that only evidence of trustworthiness serves as reasons
for trust, building on Hieronymi’s [2008] contention that considerations about
the usefulness of trust are the “wrong kind of reasons” for trust. When combined with plausible accounts of how trust might reasonably be expected to
inspire greater trustworthiness, the arguments suggest a wrong kind of reasons
challenge to explain how exactly the therapeutic thought can
I then evaluate two different strategies for responding to the arguments
by appeal to cases of rational therapeutic trust. The two strategies reflect an
important difference between the Bishop Myriel and mother-daughter cases.
Bishop Myriel, we are supposing, expected that his trust in Valjean to use
the silver to make himself a better man would inspire Valjean to do the very
thing he is trusting him to do (use the silver to make himself a better man).
In such “self-fulfilling prophecy” cases, as we will call them, the therapeutic
thought is that trusting someone to φ will make it more likely that they will
φ; trust is expected to be something like a self-fulfilling prophecy, causally
contributing to its own fulfillment. Self-fulfilling prophecy cases contrast with
“long-term” cases of therapeutic trust, such as the case of Jones’ mother, who
expects trusting the daughter with the house to have only long-term effects.
(Holton’s shopowner case can be stipulated to be either kind of case, depending
on whether you expect that your trust in the employee will prompt him not
to steal on this occasion.)
I argue that only self-fulfilling prophecy cases provide resources for an adequate response to the wrong kind of reasons challenge. In Section 4, focusing
order to “draw [the employee] back into the moral community” or because the shopowner
thinks this is the way one ought to treat an employee. [Holton, 1994, 63] Other theorists
define therapeutic trust less narrowly so that it can include other moral benefits to the
trusted besides increasing trust-responsiveness.
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on a version of the Bishop Myriel case, I argue that the therapeutic thought
can make it rational to believe or boost one’s confidence in someone’s trustworthiness. In such cases, the therapeutic thought does not serve as evidence
of trustworthiness but is epistemically relevant.
Most theorists in the literature focus on long-term cases such as Jones’
mother-daughter case, arguing that therapeutic trust can be adopted for nonevidential reasons precisely because it is a kind of non-doxastic trust, which
does not require an outright belief that someone will prove trustworthy. Thus,
Holton says that you can trust the employee with the till without believing
that he won’t steal, and Jones suggests that the mother trusts despite having
little confidence that the daughter will take good care of the house. Some go
as far as to say that therapeutic trust can be adopted without any confidence
at all that the trusted will prove trustworthy. For example, H.J.N. Horsburgh
(who coined the “therapeutic trust” label) claims that therapeutic trust “is
placed in response to what is believed to be a moral need, and so does not
presuppose any favorable estimate of those in whom it is reposed.” [Horsburgh,
1960, 349, emphasis mine]
Based in part on long-term cases, theorists have proposed two prominent
alternatives to the idea that trust consists in belief or confidence of trustworthiness. Jones concludes from the mother-daughter case that trust consists in
willingly adopting vulnerabilities with respect to the trusted and having normative expectations about the way they should behave. [Jones, 2004, McGeer,
2008, McLeod, 2015] Others argue that trust can consist in accepting or presupposing, without believing, that the trusted person will prove trustworthy.
[Frost-Arnold, 2014, Holton, 1994]
In Section 5 I argue that there are strong reasons to doubt that there are
rational cases of long-term therapeutic trust. Jones’ mother-daughter case, in
particular, is best construed as a case in which the mother merely entrusts
the house to the daughter without trusting her. When properly understood,
the case is a counterexample to the adopted vulnerabilities and acceptance
accounts of non-doxastic trust that many take it to support.
Section 6 suggests a promising alternative account that takes trust to consist in being confident enough to take certain kinds of risk on someone’s proving trustworthy. The confident-enough-to-risk account allows a significant but
limited role for non-evidential considerations, including some therapeutic considerations.

2 Preliminaries
2.1 Trusting-With and Trusting-To
At least two important locutions in English can be used to pick out the attitude
of interpersonal trust:2
2 We also sometimes speak of trust as a two-place relation: ‘A trusts B’. I set aside the
question of the relation between 2-place trust and trusting people to perform certain actions,
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1. ‘A trusts B to φ’, where φ is an action. (For example, “Bishop Myriel
trusted Jean Valjean to use the silver to become a better man.” “The mother
trusted the daughter to care for the house.”)
2. ‘A trusts B with X’, where X is a thing of value to A. (E.g., “Bishop Myriel
trusted Valjean with the silver.” “The mother trusted the daughter with
the house.”)
Both the trust-to and trust-with locutions can be used to describe our central
examples, and both have played a role in the trust literature. It will thus be
helpful to make a few points about their relation.3
First, the trust-to locution is a more general way of describing the attitude
of trust. [Holton, 1994, 63] The attitude involved in trusting someone with a
thing of value is a special case of trusting the person to φ, namely that of
trusting the person to care properly for the valuable thing. Trust-to cannot
similarly be explained in terms of trust-with, however, since not all cases of
trusting someone to φ involve giving (or being disposed to give) a thing of
value to the trusted. For example, there is no obvious thing one entrusts when
one is trusting a friend to tell the truth or to bring wine to the party one is
hosting.
Second, both locutions exhibit an interesting (and, so far as I know, unremarked upon) shift in meaning between the present tense construction (‘A
trusts B to φ’ or ‘A trusts B with X’) and the present continuous (‘A is
trusting B to φ’ or ‘A is trusting B with X’). Compare, for example:
Present Tense: The mother trusts the daughter to care for the house.
The mother trusts the daughter with the house.
Present Continuous Tense: The mother is trusting the daughter to care
for the house. The mother is trusting the daughter with the house.
The claims in the present continuous tense are logically stronger, implying
that the trustor performs an action or actions that manifest the attitude of
trust. To say that the mother is trusting the daughter to care for the house
for the weekend implies that the mother is acting on her trust in the daughter
to care for the house. The present tense constructions attribute the attitude
of trust but do not imply that the trustor takes any such actions (though
they may carry a strong conversational implicature to this effect). It can be
true that a mother trusts the daughter with the house (or, trusts her to take
proper care of it) even though she has never left the daughter alone for the
weekend and has invited the daughter’s grandparents over this weekend while
she’s away. “It’s not that I don’t trust you with the house,” she might explain
to her daughter. “I do trust you with it, but your grandparents really wanted
to come and spend time with you.”
though I am somewhat inclined to think that the former can be understood (though probably
not cleanly defined) in terms of the latter. However, see Faulkner [2015], Domenicucci and
Holton [2017] for arguments that the two-place trust relation is more fundamental.
3 The first has been the dominant focus of analysis in the recent literature, although
Annette Baier [1986], the wellspring of contemporary philosophical discussion of trust, takes
trusting people with things of value as her analysandum.
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The present continuous tense is useful for describing actions that manifest
the attitude of trust, actions that the trustor performs because they trust.
In the case of your trusting someone with X, the actions that manifest trust
involve your giving or entrusting X to someone’s care. Thus, saying that the
mother is trusting the daughter with the house implies that the mother entrusts the house to the daughter’s care because she trusts the daughter to
properly care for it. (More generally, if A is trusting B with X, then A entrusts X to B because A trusts B to care properly for X.)

2.2 Trusting vs. Entrusting
Note well: here and throughout I will use “trust” and “entrust” to mark an
important distinction that is present in ordinary English usage, but has the
potential to cause confusion. The Pocket OED defines “entrust” as follows:
1. assign the responsibility for doing something to (someone). “I’ve been
entrusted with the task of getting him safely back.”
1.1 put (something) into someone’s care or protection. “You persuade
people to entrust their savings to you.”
So defined, entrusting does not require having the attitude of trust.4 One can
assign responsibility for doing something or put something into someone’s care
without trusting the person to fulfill the responsibility or properly care for the
thing. You might, for example, entrust a secret to someone whom you do not
trust to keep the secret. Perhaps you want the information to be leaked, or you
want to catch the person in the act of spreading the secret. Likewise, a mother
might entrust the house to a teenage daughter for the weekend without trusting
her with the house. In a much less happy case than the one Jones describes,
for example, a mother might entrust the house to the daughter without any
therapeutic motive, expecting her to fail and hoping to shame her when she
does.5
The distinction between trusting and entrusting suggests a challenge that
an adequate theory of trust must meet: it must properly distinguish between
actions that manifest a genuine attitude of trust and those that are merely
cases of entrusting. Section 5 will later suggest that some recent accounts of
trust fail to meet this challenge.
4 Readers are invited to take this as stipulative if they doubt that ordinary English usage
always distinguishes quite so cleanly between entrusting as an action and trusting as an
attitude.
5 Hieronymi [2008] uses “entrust” in a different way, to mean having an attitude of trust
that does not involve outright belief in someone’s trustworthiness. This does not accord
with ordinary usage, which allows for cases in which one entrusts but lacks trust (or even
distrusts) and cases in which one both entrusts and believes the other will prove trustworthy.
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2.3 Trust and Reliance
A further point of clarification, common in the recent literature on trust,
concerns the difference between trust and reliance;6 reliance is insufficient for
trust.7 Whereas we commonly rely on inanimate objects (e.g., we rely on
a rope to hold us), we trust inanimate objects only in a metaphorical usage.
Further, we can rely on persons without trusting them, by merely incorporating
predictions of their actions into our practical plans. For example, you might
predict that an opponent in a game will make a bad move and so rely on them
to do so, but you will not thereby count as trusting them to make the bad
move. Moreover, whereas a mafioso trusts his underlings to the extent that he
expects them to act out of loyalty, he merely relies on their predictable actions
to the extent to which he motivates them by threats, bribes, or the making of
offers that cannot be refused. If he genuinely trusted them he would not take
himself to need these methods of motivation.
What is this difference between trust and reliance? We will assume (again,
following most of the recent literature) that trusting someone to φ, unlike
relying on the person, involves some kind of expectation not only that the
person will perform φ but also that they will do so for the right kinds of
reasons—that they will, as we sometimes say, “prove trustworthy” in φ-ing.8
Proposals for what it is to prove trustworthy, acting for the “right kind of
reasons,” have included 1) acting out of goodwill toward the trustor, [Baier,
1986]; 2) following through on a commitment to φ [Hawley, 2014]; and 3)
being motivated to φ by the thought that the trustor is relying, depending,
or counting on you. [Faulkner, 2014, 2007, Jones, 1996, McGeer and Pettit,
2017].
Although we need not settle on a general account of what it is to expect
someone to prove trustworthy in performing an action, it is worth noting that
the distinction between trusting and entrusting suggests a plausible account
for cases of trusting-with. When one trusts someone with a thing of value,
the expectation seems to be that the person will properly care for X, at least
in part, because they have been entrusted with X. Entrusting someone with
X is a normatively richer action than merely giving X; it involves assigning
6 [Baier, 1986, Holton, 1994, Jones, 1996]. Theorists differ as to whether this distinction
is always present in English usage. Faulkner suggests that “trust” has two senses; he uses
“affective trust” to name the sense that contrasts with reliance and “predictive trust” for a
usage that he takes to be tantamount to mere reliance. McGeer and Pettit [2017] suggest
that the concept of trust that contrasts with reliance may have become a philosopher’s term
of art.
7 Many in the literature hold that reliance is nevertheless necessary for trust, or even that
trust is a special case of reliance. See Thompson [2017] for criticism of this idea. We need
not take a stand on this issue here.
8 Someone’s “proving trustworthy” in performing an action is not intended to imply that
the person has the general trait of trustworthiness. In the intended usage, an untrustworthy
person might prove trustworthy in performing an action on a single occasion, while remaining
generally untrustworthy. This, I think, accords with standard English usage. Even so, I will
often prefer “proves trust-responsive” to “proves trustworthy” in order to avoid the misleading
impression that it is the general character trait that is in view.
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responsibility for properly caring for X. Entrusting people thus places normative demands on them, giving them reasons to perform the actions that they
would not otherwise have. When one trusts someone with X, one expects the
fact that one has entrusted them to “weigh with them as a reason” to care
properly for X.9
3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Challenge
3.1 Two Arguments for the Evidence-Only View
With these preliminary points about the attitude of trust in hand, let us turn
to considering the kinds of reasons that can support trust. I will take for
granted that one main kind of reason for trusting someone involves evidence
that someone will prove trust-responsive.10 Let us say that an evidential reason for a proposition is a consideration that raises the epistemic probability
of a proposition given one’s total evidence. (We leave open a wide range of
options for understanding epistemic probability and what constitutes one’s total evidence.) Paradigm cases of evidential reasons for thinking someone will
prove trustworthy include track-record arguments supporting the claim that
someone is generally trustworthy or trustworthy in some particualar domain.
Online ratings of others, for example, give us evidence that others will follow
through on their commitments in the marketplace and serve as reasons on the
basis of which many of us are willing to trust total strangers.
Pamela Hieronymi [2008] argues for the stronger claim that only such evidence of trustworthiness can serve as reasons for trust. Thus, Hieronymi:
[O]ne trusts another to do something to the degree that one harbours
a trusting belief that the other will do that thing. Like any belief, this
trusting belief (if it is supported by reasons at all) can only be supported
by reasons which one takes to bear on its truth....[R]easons that show
trust good, important, etc., will not bear on the truth of the trusting
belief—they will not bear on whether the person in question will do the
thing in question. [Hieronymi, 2008, 235]
This passage actually suggests two distinct arguments. The first, and more
widely discussed, begins with a claim about the nature of outright trust: To
trust someone to do something is just to have an outright belief that they will
prove trust-responsive in doing the thing in question. Call this the Doxastic
Account of Trust:
Doxastic Account of Trust: A trusts B to φ if and only if A
believes that B will prove trustworthy in φ-ing.
9

I borrow the language of “weighing with someone as a reason” from [McGeer and Pettit,
2017, 15].
10 One important stream of work on trust, which takes inspiration from Richard Moran’s
work on testimony, challenges the idea that evidence can serve as a reason for trust. [Moran,
2005, McMyler, 2011, Marušić, 2015, 2017] Unfortunately, I cannot adequately engage these
arguments here. See Simpson [2018] for relevant criticism.
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A Doxastic Account of Trust is not uncommon.11 Hieronymi gives an influential
argument for it (to which we will respond in Section 5.1) based on an example
in which you decide to show up at a restaurant at which you’ve agreed to meet
her, even though you have serious doubts and are agnostic about whether she
will show up. Hieronymi says that if she were to find out that you did not
believe that she would show up, she could properly complain that you did not
trust her:
Certainly your actions are somehow more trusting than those of someone who, in the face of such doubt, did not come to the restaurant at
all. Nevertheless, I could rightly complain that your lack of confidence
betrays a lack of trust. [Hieronymi, 2008, 218]
Given this Doxastic Account of Trust, the conclusion that only evidence for
trustworthiness can serve as genuine reasons for trust is entailed by the following Evidence-Only Thesis for Belief:
Evidence-Only Thesis for Belief: The only reasons that can make
it rational to believe p are evidential reasons for p.
This epistemological thesis is widely held,12 though not uncontroversial.13 A
familiar way of motivating the Evidence-Only Thesis for Belief begins with
the observation that practical incentives seem impotent in producing belief,
for someone rational, in the face of strong evidence against a proposition. If
offered $10,000 to believe that the moon is made of green cheese, for example,
you could not use this consideration as a reason to believe that it is true that
the moon is made of green cheese. [Alston, 1988] Whereas we can change our
beliefs in the light of new evidence, considerations about the desirability or
usefulness of belief seem to be the wrong kind of reasons for belief.
The Doxastic Account of Trust and the Evidence-Only Thesis for Belief
together entail the following Evidence-Only Thesis for Trust:
Evidence-Only Thesis for Trust: The only reasons that can make
it rational for A to trust B to φ are evidential reasons for thinking that
B will prove trustworthy to φ.
Although this “wrong kind of reasons” challenge is framed in terms of outright
trust and outright belief, it is notable that Hieronymi talks in terms of degrees
of trust and belief in the passage cited above. One trusts, she says, “to the
degree that one harbors a trusting belief.” The passage suggests a second (and
11 On Richard Hardin’s view, for example, “The declarations ‘I believe you are trustworthy’
and ‘I trust you’ are equivalent.” [Hardin, 2004, 10] Theorists who hold that trusting someone
to φ requires believing that they will φ include [Baker, 1987, Hieronymi, 2008, McMyler,
2011, Marušić, 2015, 2017].
12 It is endorsed by Shah and David Velleman [2005], Kelly [2003], Hieronymi [2008],
Martin [2013], among others. Also related are Uniqueness theses, such as the one defended
by Feldman [2007], according to which a body of evidence justifies only one doxastic attitude
vis-a-vis belief, disbelief, and withholding.
13 See Sylvan [2016] for discussion. Pragmatic encroachment accounts of justification deny
it. See [Fantl and McGrath, 2009, Pace, 2011].
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under-discussed) wrong kind of reasons challenge, targetting the claim that
non-evidential reasons can properly strengthen trust.
To see it, begin with the idea that strength of trust is fundamentally a
matter of one’s degree of confidence that someone will prove trustworthy:
Degree of Confidence Account of Strength of Trust: How
strongly A trusts B to φ depends solely on A’s degree of confidence
that B will prove trustworthy to φ.
The account is intended to appeal only to a non-technical conception of degrees of confidence; we can think of a degree of confidence as the likelihood of
a proposition from a subject’s perspective, leaving open further ways of understanding the notion. So construed, there is considerable initial plausibility
to explaining strength of trust in terms of confidence that someone will prove
trustworthy. After all, natural replies to questions about strength of trust —
e.g., “How strong is your trust in me to do what I promised?” — are quite
naturally framed in terms of degrees of confidence: “I’m completely confident
that you will do what you promised,” or “I am not at all confident that you
will do what you promised.”
A common epistemological claim concerning degrees of confidence, somewhat less controversial than the Evidence-Only Thesis for Belief, is the following:
Evidence-Only Thesis for Degrees of Confidence: The only
reasons that can make it rational to increase one’s degree of confidence
in a proposition are evidential considerations in favor of the proposition.
Given the Degrees of Confidence Account of Strength of Trust and the EvidenceOnly Thesis for Degrees of Confidence, we get the following thesis that only
evidence of trustworthiness can strengthen trust:
Evidence-Only Thesis for Strength of Trust: The only reasons that can make it rational for A to strengthen trust in B to φ are
evidential considerations suggesting that B will prove trustworthy to
φ.
In sum, we have seen two wrong kind of reasons challenges to the idea that
there are non-evidential reasons for trust. One relies on a view about the
nature of outright trust—that it consists in an outright belief about someone’s
proving trustworthy—and concludes on epistemic grounds that only evidential
considerations can serve as reasons for trust. The other relies on a claim about
strength of trust—that it consists in one’s degree of confidence that someone
will prove trustworthy—and concludes on epistemic grounds that only evidence
can rationally strengthen trust.
How might one respond to these arguments by appeal to cases of therapeutic trust? Recall that cases of therapeutic trust were stipulated to be cases
in which the following therapeutic thought (or its ilk) serves as a reason for
trusting someone to φ:
Therapeutic Thought: If I were to trust B to φ, then my trust
would likely inspire B to be more trust-responsive.
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In self-fulfilling prophecy cases, one expects that trusting someone to φ would
inspire them to prove trust-responsive to φ. In long-term cases, one expects
only that trust would inspire greater trust-responsiveness at some time in the
future.
Self-fulfilling prophecy and long-term cases make possible quite different
responses to the wrong kind of reasons challenges. In Section 4, we will consider
a response based on self-fulfilling prophecy cases of therapeutic trust that
targets the epistemic premises (the evidence-only theses for belief and degrees
of confidence). In Section 5, we consider a response, based on long term cases,
that denies the doxastic account of trust. (As we will see, though, the strategy
founders in answering the wrong kind of reasons challenge to strength of trust.)

3.2 Therapeutic Trust To the Rescue?
Before discussing these responses, though, let us consider an initial reason to
doubt that therapeutic trust will escape the wrong kind of reasons challenge.
Notice, first, that in cases of therapeutic trust, the trustor expects the
attitude of trust—and not merely the act of entrusting—to elicit greater trustresponsiveness. If the point made in Section 2.3 is correct, ordinary cases of
trust routinely, and perhaps constitutively, involve an expectation that the
act of entrusting someone with an object or a task will have an effect on
them, making it more likely that they will act appropriately. Therapeutic
trust involves the stronger expectation that the trusted will be moved also
by the recognition that you trust them, in a manner similar to the examples
of inspirational trust that began this paper. The inspirational effects in such
cases would be undermined if the trustee failed to believe that the trust is
genuine. For example, if Valjean were to believe that Bishop Myriel was merely
pretending to trust, or if the daughter were to believe this of the mother, the
motivational effects would disappear.
How might trust reasonably be expected to inspire the trusted? It will
be helpful to consider in more detail how trust inspires in ordinary, nontherapeutic cases. Suppose we consider the Bishop Myriel example, as we did
at the outset, as a paradigm case in which trust inspires, without adding the
more complex assumption that Bishop Myriel based his trust on therapeutic
considerations. What is it about Bishop Myriel’s trust that inspired Valjean
to become more trust-responsive?
McGeer and Pettit [2017] propose two main mechanisms to explain how
trust inspires trustworthiness, each of which is plausibly at work in the Bishop
Myriel example.14 First, manifesting trust can be a source of encouragement
14

McGeer and Pettit also discuss a third, “request-based” mechanism. [McGeer and Pettit,
2017, 24] Manifesting trust in someone, they suggest, often involves an explicit or implicit
request that they do the thing in question. If the trusted does not decline the request, they
thereby make a tacit promise to do the thing in question, and they thus gain whatever
extra motivational oomph comes from making a promise as opposed to merely declaring
an intention. (This mechanism is also nicely illustrated in Les Mis. Bishop Myriel implores
Valjean: “Do not forget, never forget, that you have promised to use this money in becoming

12

Michael Pace

for the trusted, much like having someone shout “You can do it!” as you are
biking up a steep hill. The thought that you have been sincerely trusted
to do something can boost your confidence in your own capacity to prove
trust-responsive, thereby strengthening it. [McGeer and Pettit, 2017, 22] Applied to the Myriel-Valjean case, for example, Valjean’s belief that Bishop
Myriel trusted him with the silver plausibly encouraged Valjean to prove trustresponsive by helping him to think of himself as someone capable of doing so.15
Second, manifesting trust can inspire in virtue of the way trust shows
respect or esteem to the trusted as someone who is trust-responsive. (Cf. Pettit
[1995]) The trusted might be motivated to be more trust-responsive in order
to maintain the respect and esteem of the trustor. Thus, we might plasubily
suppose that Valjean was motivated to use the silver to become a better man,
in part, because he wanted to maintain the respect and esteem Bishop Myriel
showed in trusting him. Having the respect and esteem of those whom we
respect and esteem can be a powerful motivator.16
These mechanisms, which plausibly explain trust’s power to inspire trustworthiness, also suggest a prima facie reason to worry that therapeutic trust
will not escape the wrong kind of reasons problem. Each mechanism seems to
require, for its operation, that one’s manifest trust communicates a belief or
high degree of confidence in the trusted to prove trust-responsive. What the
trusted regards as encouraging or esteeming seems to be the apparent fact that
the trustor has a confident belief that they will prove trustworthy. As McGeer
suggests in earlier work, when we are inspired by the trust of a respected parent or mentor, “the galvanizing thought that drives us forward is...‘I want to
be as she already sees me to be.’ ” [McGeer, 2008, 249]
But if the only kind of trust that could reasonably be expected to inspire greater trust-responsiveness is trust that manifests confident belief in
the trusted’s current trust-responsiveness, then it is difficult to see how theran honest man.” The admonition surprises Valjean, “who had no recollection of ever having
promised anything.” McGeer and Pettit’s discussion plausibly explains why Myriel was right;
in voluntarily accepting the gift of the silver, Valjean implicitly makes just such a promise.)
However, as I see it, this mechanism is not relevant to therapeutic trust, since it does not
require the attitude of trust for its operation. It is the entrusting of the silver, the till, or the
secret, etc., that generates the implicit promise and consequent obligation, whether or not it
is accompanied by the attitude of trust. Valjean’s accepting the gift would have amounted
to promising even if Bishop Myriel had not genuinely trusted Valjean to use the silver to
become a better man.
15 Upon giving the silver, Bishop Myriel says, “Jean Valjean, my brother, you no longer
belong to evil, but to good.” [Hugo, 2008, Kindle location 2201]. One might take this as
an explicit pronouncement of the sort of encouragement that is already demonstrated in
his trusting Valjean with the silver. (This interpretation, admittedly, ignores Myriel’s next
claim—“I have bought your soul for God”—which suggests that other more controversial
theological reasons may be at work. Thanks to Teresa Morgan for pointing this out.)
16 Such positive effects may be contingent on the overall context and one’s particular
psychology. It may be that distrust can, in some circumstances, also have therapeutic effects,
prompting the trustor to aim at gaining or winning back someone’s trust. There may be
room here for a notion of therapeutic distrust, when one manifests a distrustful attitude
with the aim of trying to elicit more trust-responsiveness. (Cf. Tsai [2017] for a discussion
of the potential therapeutic effects of showing disrespect.)
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apeutic trust could serve as a reason for trust. Someone with good reason to
think that the encouragement or esteem mechanisms would be operative will
need to manifest confident belief to engage the mechanism. As we have seen,
though, the evidence-only theses for belief and confidence suggest that only
evidence of trust-responsiveness could serve as proper reasons to believe or
boost one’s confidence in someone’s trust-responsiveness.
Of course, someone skilled at deception might attempt to secure the hoped
for therapeutic effects by faking trust or by acting as if one’s trust is stronger
than it is. However, cases of therapeutic trust in the literature are intended
to be both rational and morally admirable, and we will take for granted that
any genuine case of rational therapeutic trust would not involve deception (including self-deception) regarding the strength of the attitude or the reasons
for it. We will assume that any case of rational therapeutic trust would pass
a version of Annette Baier’s “expressibility test” for morally decent trust relations. It would survive the reflective awareness of both the trustor and trustee
concerning the actual reasons on which the trust is based.17 To communicate
a strength of trust one lacks or to aim at adopting trust that one deems irrational would violate the expressibility requirement. Thus, in order for the
mother-daughter or Myriel-Valjean cases to count as rational cases of therapeutic trust, their entrusting of the house, the silver, must communicate a
genuine attitude of trust, the sincerity and inspirational effects of which would
survive full disclosure of the reasons on which the trust is based.
Thus, we have a wrong kind of reasons challenge for rational therapeutic
trust. It looks as if the sort of trust capable of inspiring trustworthiness requires
confident belief in the trusted to prove trustworthy. But confident belief is just
what the epistemic theses suggest cannot be adopted without evidence.

4 Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Cases of Therapeutic Trust
In this section, I argue that self-fulfilling prophecy cases make possible a successful reply to the wrong kind of reasons challenges. Some such cases are
counterexamples to the claim that only evidence can properly boost confidence, related to the Jamesian theme that in some special circumstances a
belief can “help to create its own fact.” [James, 1896]. In such cases, the Therapeutic Thought can rationally boost confidence and even serve as a reason
for belief, even though it is not evidence of trust-responsiveness.
To see this, let us propose some further details regarding the deliberations
that led Bishop Myriel to trust Jean Valjean with the silver. Suppose, for
example, that even though Bishop Myriel initially has a low confidence in the
proposition, If Valjean is given the silver he will use it to become a better man,
he also knows (or has good reason to believe) the following version of the
Therapeutic Thought:
17 [Baier, 1986]. See [McGeer, 2008] for a defense of the claim that Baier’s expressibility
test is also appropriate as a test of the rationality of trust.
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Therapeutic Thought: If I were to manifest confident trust in Valjean to use the silver to become a better man, Valjean will likely use
the silver to become a better man.
We might suppose, as Victor Hugo’s depiction of Bishop Myriel suggests, that
Myriel has developed a keen insight into the psychology of people in Valjean’s
situation, gleaned from years of experience working with the poor and oppressed. His wisdom and insight allows him to predict the effects his trust
would likely have on Valjean. (In other possible cases, the trustor may be a
parent or mentor with more personal knowledge of the trusted’s psychology.)
The Therapeutic Thought, in this case, is not an evidential reason for
Myriel to think that Valjean will prove trustworthy. Evidential reasons, as we
defined them, raise the likelihood of a proposition given one’s total evidence.
But at this time in his deliberation, Bishop Myriel’s total evidence does not
include that he has a high confidence that Valjean will prove trustworthy. He
is only entitled to think that Valjean would prove trustworthy if he, Bishop
Myriel, were to take a leap of faith beyond the current evidence.
Although the therapeutic thought is not an evidential reason for thinking
that Valjean will prove trustworthy with the silver, neither is it epistemically
irrelevant. Let us say that an epistemic reason is a reason that bears on whether
some state is epistemically rational, where epistemic rationality is a matter of
having beliefs or degrees of confidence that are normatively appropriate from
the point of view of accurate representation. One who is epistemically rational
does well with respect to the goal of believing things if and only if they are
true, and the goal of having a confidence that fits one’s total evidence. If the
therapeutic thought is warranted for Bishop Myriel, he can see in advance that
if he were to believe Valjean will prove trust-responsive, the belief would likely
be accurate. He can also see in advance that if he were to boost his confidence in
the proposition that Valjean will prove trustworthy, his confidence would fit the
evidence he would then have (which would include his increased confidence).
The therapeutic thought in this case is thus an epistemic as well as a practical
reason; it is a consideration that supports boosting one’s confidence in the
proposition that the trusted will likely prove trustworthy, as an appropriate
way of pursuing the goal of accurate representation.18
Thus, if one is warranted in thinking that manifesting trust in someone
to φ will make it significantly more likely that they will prove trustworthy to
φ, one will thereby have a non-evidential but epistemic reason to boost one’s
prior confidence that the trusted will prove trustworthy. If the increase would
be enough for one’s confidence to count as an outright belief, one will also
have a non-evidential but epistemic reason to adopt doxastic trust.
18 One might be skeptical that it is psychologically possible to bootstrap your way to trust
in the way self-fulfilling prophecy cases require. However, as Sharadin [2016] (who argues
against an evidence-only account of justified belief based on a similar scenario) points out,
this is an empirical consideration, as yet untested, and there seems to be no non-questionbegging philosophical reason to deny that such reasons can motivate.
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5 Long-Term Cases and Non-Doxastic Trust
As we noted above, theorists who appeal to therapeutic trust cases have typically focused on long-term cases of therapeutic trust, such as Jones’ home alone
teenager case. Such cases, they contend, show that the Doxastic Account of
Trust is false; trust can be adopted even in cases in which one does not have
an outright belief that the trusted will prove trustworthy. Below we will see
that such appeals fail to provide an adequate response to the wrong kind of
reasons challenge targetting strength of trust, and we will see strong reasons
to doubt that there are long-term cases of rational therapeutic trust. In the
next sub-section, though, I argue that although the strategy that appeals to
long term therapeutic trust is misguided, it is not misguided in rejecting the
Doxastic Account of Trust.

5.1 In Defense of Non-Doxastic Trust
Some points that we have seen already suggest that there are non-doxastic
cases of trust, pace Hieronymi’s defense of the Doxastic Account of Trust.
Recall Hieronymi’s claim that if she found out that you were agnostic about
her showing up to the restaurant, she could “rightly complain that your lack
of confidence betrays a lack of trust.” In reply, a defender of nondoxastic trust
should acknowledge Hieronymi’s point that your lack of confidence betrays
some lack of trust. But why think that outright trust must be ideally strong?
A natural rejoinder you could make to Hieronymi’s complaint is that your
confidence was strong enough: “I did trust you. My trust in you to show up
was strong enough that I came to the restaurant. If I had not trusted you to
show up, I would not have come.”
This type of rejoinder, which highlights your trusting enough to take some
salient risk, is even more compelling in some cases of trusting-with-X. Even
if Bishop Myriel was not confident enough to believe outright that Valjean
would use the gift of the silver to become a better man, he could defend his
claim to have trusted Valjean with the silver by noting that he trusted Valjean
enough to take an enormous risk in giving him the silver.
We can make the same point by considering a variation of the motherdaughter case. In the variation, we will take back Jones’ stipulation that would
make this a case of therapeutic trust, namely that the mother trusts the daughter with the house in order to inspire long-term trustworthiness. We will suppose that the mother is agnostic about whether the daughter will take good
care of the house this weekend but is confident enough to be willing to take a
risk on giving the house to the daughter. If the daughter questions her trust
after the weekend is over, she could honestly make the following response:
Mother: “I did not know whether or not you would prove trustworthy
with the house. I was agnostic about that, but I trusted you to take
care of the house anyway. I trusted you enough to risk giving it to you
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for the weekend without checking up on you. If I had not trusted you
to take care of the house, I wouldn’t have given it to you!”
Two points about the mother’s response support the idea that this is a genuine
case of non-doxastic trust. First, the second sentence conjoins a claim to trust
with a claim not to believe that the trusted will prove trustworthy. If trust
always involves outright belief, one would expect the second sentence to strike
us as infelicitous, but in the context of the explanation there seems nothing
linguistically odd about the mother’s assertion. Second, the counterfactual in
the last line is evidence that the mother entrusted the house to her daughter
because she trusted her to care for it properly. She thus meets the criteria for
trusting-with-X endorsed in section 2.1.
In Section 3.3, we worried that McGeer and Pettit’s encouragement and
esteem mechanisms might require doxastic trust in order to non-deceptively
inspire greater trust-responsiveness. It seemed that one might need to manifest
confident belief in the trusted in order to encourage or show esteem in a way
that inspires. However, the present cases suggest that non-doxastic trust can,
in principle, also show esteem and encourage in way that inspires long-term
trustworthiness and passes the expressibility test. Even if he were to find out
that Bishop Myriel was agnostic about whether he would use the silver to
become an honest man, Valjean might be inspired by the thought that Myriel
was confident enough to take the big risk of giving him the silver.
Likewise, we can imagine circumstances in which the daughter is inspired
to be more trustworthy in the future by the fact that the mother was at least
confident enough to risk being vulnerable, even though the daughter knew all
along that the mother was not fully confident and did not believe outright
that she would take good care of the house. In the Hallmark movie ending to
this version of the case, we can imagine the daughter expressing gratitude for
the mother’s trust later in life:
Daughter: “I know that you had your doubts and didn’t really believe
I’d come through, but I appreciate that you at least trusted me enough
to risk giving me the house for the weekend anyway. Your trust inspired
me. Thanks Mom.”
Notice that even though the case as described is one in which non-doxastic
trust has therapeutic effects, we have not yet vindicated this as an authentic
case of rational therapeutic trust. In order for it to count as a case of therapeutic trust, we must add to the description that the mother trusts her daughter
with the house based on a long-term therapeutic thought such as the following:
Long-Term Therapeutic Thought: If I trust the daughter with
the house, she will be more likely in the long-run to become trustresponsive.
Making sense of how the long-term therapeutic thought might serve as a reason
for non-doxastic trust requires further clarification, and we will see that there
are challenges to the idea that it can serve as a reason for trust.
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Moreover, merely defending the possibility of non-doxastic trust is not,
by itself, a sufficient response to the wrong kind of reasons challenge. Such
a defense refutes the Doxastic Account of Trust, a central premise in one of
the arguments of Section 3, but it leaves untouched the challenge framed in
terms of strength of trust. What is needed is an account of what non-doxastic
trust is and how exactly non-evidential considerations, such as the therapeutic
thought, can serve as a reason for it. Does the therapeutic thought serve as a
reason for non-doxastic trust by strengthening trust? If so, we owe a response
to the wrong kind of reasons challenge that targets strength of trust. But if
not, we need an account of how a consideration could serve as a reason for
trust without strengthening trust.
In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we will consider and criticize the two main proposals
in the literature for saying what non-doxastic trust is and how the therapeutic
thought might be thought to serve as a reason for it.

5.2 Two Accounts of Non-Doxastic Trust
What, then, is non-doxastic trust? In particular, what plays the cognitive
role in cases of non-doxastic trust, substituting for belief? Two accounts have
been prominent in the literature. A first proposal is defended by Jones in her
discussion of the home alone teenager case:
[The mother] is willing to accept vulnerability (e.g., complaints from
the neighbors and a huge cleaning task) in the hope that a policy of
trusting, consistently displayed, will bear fruit in the long run. The
mother might have no expectation that the daughter will look after the
house well—the past track record makes such predictive expectations
unwarranted. But the mother does have normative expectations of the
daughter that she look after the house well. Should the daughter fail to
do so, she will respond with resentment and reproach; she will feel let
down. [Jones, 2004, 16-7]
Jones identifies two relevant features that might be thought to substitute, in
therapeutic cases, for belief or high confidence in the daughter to properly
care for the house: 1) the mother’s normative expectations that taking care of
the house is what the daughter should do; and 2) the mother’s willingness to
embrace vulnerabilities and forego opportunities to lessen the vulnerabilities.19
The account sketched seems to take the following form:
Adopted Vulnerabilities Account: A is trusting B to φ iff 1. A
believes that B should φ; and 2. A willingly accepts vulnerability to
losses if B does not φ.
The Adopted Vulnerabilities Account is non-expectational. Thus, Jones is committed to thinking that the mother can trust the daughter with the house even
19

Cf. [Baier, 1986, 2013, McGeer, 2008]
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when she is quite confident, or even believes, that the the daughter will not
take proper care of the house on this occasion.20
A different and widely-held account suggests that the heart of non-doxastic
trust is accepting that the trusted will come through, where acceptance is taken
to be a cognitive attitude distinct from belief.21 In developing the Acceptance
Account, Karen Frost-Arnold borrows the notion of acceptance from Michael
Bratman, who uses the following example to motivate the idea:
The three of us need jointly to decide whether to build a house together.
We agree to base our deliberations on the assumption that the total
cost of the project will include the top of the estimated range offered
by each of the sub-contractors. We facilitate our group deliberations
and decisions by agreeing on a common framework of assumptions. We
each accept these assumptions in this context, the context of our group’s
deliberations, even though it may well be that none of us believes these
assumptions or accepts them in other, more individualistic contexts.
[Bratman, 1992, 7 quoted in Frost-Arnold, 2014, 1964]
To accept a proposition is to resolve to use it as a premise in one’s practical
reasoning, within a limited context. Bratman argues that acceptance differs
from belief in that it is dependent on practical and intellectual contexts, can
be shaped by reasons other than a concern for the truth, can be directly
and voluntarily chosen, and is not subject to demands for consistency across
different contexts. In Bratman’s example, we as a group accept that the total
cost will be an amount at the top of the estimated range, in order to protect
ourselves from dangers of going overbudget. When faced with group decisions
that depend on the total cost—Do we have enough money to add an extra
bathroom? What will be our tax liability?—we use the accepted proposition in
our deliberations, even though none of us believes that it accurately represents
the cost (nor even that it is the most accurate estimate available). Within the
context of our deliberations, we “take offline” our beliefs about the cost and
and use the accepted proposition.
This view of acceptance is incorporated into the following Acceptance
Account of Trust:
Acceptance Account of Trust: A trusts B to φ [in context C] iff
A either believes or accepts that B will φ and this belief or acceptance
is the basis of A’s practical reasoning [in C]. [Frost-Arnold, 2014, 1964]
The Acceptance Account allows for doxastic and nondoxastic cases of trust.
In non-doxastic cases, the trustor is said to accept, without believing, that
a person will prove trustworthy. For example, the mother might trust the
daughter to take care of the house by accepting, for purposes of practical
reasoning, the proposition that the daughter will take good care of the house
20 This is a reversal from earlier work in which she takes trust to involve an expectation
of trustworthiness. See Jones [1996].
21 [Alonso, 2016, Faulkner, 2014, Frost-Arnold, 2014, Hawley, 2014]. Cf. [Holton, 1994] for
a related account in terms of “presupposing” rather than accepting.
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this weekend, even though she does not believe this. When faced with decisions
about which the daughter’s care for the house is relevant — Should I call and
check up on her? Should I take Monday off in case the house is in disarray?
— the mother might take offline her beliefs about what the daughter will do
and reason from the accepted proposition. “My daughter will take good care
of the house,” she might say to herself, “so there is no need to call to check on
her or take Monday off.”
The Acceptance Account comes in expectational and non-expectational
versions. The non-expectational version holds that it is possible to accept that
someone will φ, and thus trust them, even when one is quite confident or even
takes oneself to know that they will not.22 According to the more widely-held
expectational version, accepting that someone will prove trust-responsive is
compatible with agnosticism but not with outright disbelief concerning their
proving trust-responsive.23

5.3 The Risk Constraint on Trust
The Adopted Vulnerabilities Account and the Acceptance Account share a
common problem: both incorrectly imply that some cases of mere entrusting
are genuine cases of trusting. The problem is especially apparent for versions
of the views that are non-expectational, placing no epistemic constraints on
acceptance. Below I will suggest that one case-in-point is the mother in Jones’
version of the home-alone teenager example, but it will be helpful to focus first
on a different example, involving Gandhi’s non-violent resistance.
When Gandhi and his followers placed themselves in positions in which
they expected the authorities to brutally enforce unjust laws—when they refused to defend themselves against the onslaught of excessive force—they acted
in a way that meets the Adopted Vulnerability Account’s criteria for trusting
the authorities. To put some flesh on the case, consider one of Gandhi’s earliest acts of non-violent resistance (powerfully depicted by a scene in Richard
Attenborough’s film), in which Gandhi publicly burns registration cards that
Indians were forced to carry and that symbolized their second-class status under South African Apartheid. While placing cards in the fire, the leader of the
police strikes Gandhi down with a baton. Gandhi struggles to get up and place
more cards in the fire...and is met with another blow. The process repeats, until Gandhi can no longer move. Each effort to burn additional cards involved
very deliberately adopting (and actively rejecting ways of avoiding) vulnerabilities of just the sort described by the Adopted Vulnerabilities Account. And,
of course, Gandhi had normative expectations; he no doubt believed that the
22

Facundo Alonso [2016] suggests that one can accept and thus rely on or trust someone to
φ based solely on practical reasons, even when one knows that the person will not φ. (Alonso
actually makes this claim about “reliance,” but he maintains that reliance is necessary for
trust and constitutes the cognitive component of trust.) Cf. Thompson [2017], who expresses
sympathy for the view that trust, but not reliance, is non-expectational.
23 Cf. [Holton, 1994, 71]; [Frost-Arnold, 2014, 1968]; [Faulkner, 2007, 316].
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authorities should not use such excessive force. Gandhi thus meets the conditions put forward by the Adopted Vulnerabilities Account for trusting the
authorities to care for his life and well-being.
Moreover, if there are no epistemic constraints on acceptance — if one
can accept what one knows ain’t so — we can stipulate for the example that
Gandhi adopted the relevant vulnerabilities by accepting (for practical purposes, in the limited context of the protest) that the authorities would justly
care for his life and well-being. Suppose that each time he deliberated about
whether to consign another card to the fire, he took offline his belief that the
police would probably beat him, resolving to act on the proposition that they
would properly care for his life and well-being this time. (This might, perhaps, be a psychologically effective strategy for bracing oneself to adopt the
extreme vulnerabilities required for non-violent resistance.) Given this stipulation about his psychology, Gandhi meets the conditions for trust articulated
by the non-expectational version of the Acceptance Account.24
Both accounts thus seem committed to the claim that Gandhi was trusting
the police with his life and well-being in acting as he did. However, this is a
clear case of entrusting without trusting. In Section 2, we noted that in genuine
cases of trusting someone with X, one entrusts X to them because one trusts
them to care properly for X. It is clear from the example, though, that Gandhi
did not entrust his life and well-being to authorities because he trusted them
to care properly for these things. To the contrary, it was Gandhi’s distrust of
the officials to care for his life and well-being that was his reason for entrusting
them. His goal in entrusting was to publicly expose their injustice.
Although Gandhi clearly did not trust the authorities with his life and wellbeing, there is a trust-relevant explanation of Gandhi’s actions that involves
trust in the authorities, and highlighting it will prove useful for analyzing proposed cases of long-term therapeutic trust. As Ryan Preston-Roedder [2013,
671] argues, Gandhi’s commitment to nonviolence rested on a kind of faith
in those in positions of power to be moved by their consciences (eventually)
to repent of their injustice if presented with poignant, public examples of it.
Athough Gandhi did not trust the authorities to act justly, he arguably did
trust them to be capable of one day becoming trustworthy in this way, if given
the right sort of experiences. The relevant distinction is one that McGeer [2008]
helpfully describes as a difference between having a “first” and “second line of
trust.” The first line of trust involves trusting someone to φ. The second line
of trust involves trusting them to one day become the sort of person who can
properly be trusted to φ; it can serve as a fall-back position that warrants acts
24

So far as I can see, the two accounts are also vulnerable to a counterexample based on
the case (mentioned in Section 2.2) of a vindictive parent who believes the daughter will
wreck the house but entrusts her with it in order to shame her for her untrustworthiness.
The goal of shaming the daughter might lead the parent to adopt the relevant vulnerabilities
and to ground her weekend deliberations on the assumption (which she believes to be false)
that the daughter will take good care of the house. The parent in this case clearly does not
genuinely trust the daughter with the house.
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of entrusting when the first line of trust is weak (or even, as in Gandhi’s case,
when one distrusts).
With this distinction in hand, consider the following hypotheses:
First Line of Trust Hypothesis: Gandhi entrusted his life and well-being
to the authorities because he trusted them to properly care for his life
and well-being.
Second Line of Trust Hypothesis: Gandhi entrusted his life and wellbeing to the authorities because he trusted them to become the sort of
people who can properly be trusted with his life and wellbeing (if given
the right sort of experiences).
Although the first line of trust hypothesis is false, the second line of trust
explanation of Gandhi’s actions is, arguably, deep and important. It plays a
crucial role in explaining why Gandhi and his followers were willing to place
themselves in circumstances in which they expected the authorities to enforce
unjust laws, and why they often refused to defend themselves against the
onslaught of excessive force. Without trust in oppressive authorities to be
capable of changing for the better, non-violent forms of resistance can seem
pointless. No surprise, then, that debates about whether resistance should
take a non-violent form often focus on whether the second line of trust is
warranted.25 However, we should not confuse the plausible claim that Gandhi
had the second line of trust in the authorities (trusting them to one day become
the sort of people who can be properly trusted with his life and wellbeing)
with the implausible claim, which is implied by the non-expectational version
of the Acceptance Account and the Adopted Vulnerabilities Account, that
Gandhi had the first line of trust (trusting the authorities with his life and
well-being).
A similar analysis applies to Jones’ version of the mother-daughter case,
in which the mother believes the daughter will not take good care of the
house. Suppose that the mother engages in the following deliberation, which,
according to the accounts under consideration, should result in her trusting
the daughter with the house for long-term therapeutic reasons (and which she
helpfully frames using the terminology of the accounts):
Mother: “I know my daughter will not take good care of the house if I
entrust her with it. However, it would be good for her long-term moral
development if I trust her to care for it. After she wrecks the house, I
will be able to point out that she let me down, even though I trusted
her with the house. The regret she feels will hopefully prompt her to be
more trustworthy in the future. It is worth the cleanup, neighborhood
complaints, etc. to do this for her. So, I will accept that she will take
25 Further, the second-line of trust suggests a plausible explanation of a key advantage
often touted by defenders of non-violent resistance—that non-violence makes it more likely
to secure justice and a lasting peace. One reason for this advantage may well involve the
way that manifesting the second line of trust in someone shows respect for them as a person
capable of changing for the better.
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care of the house, using this proposition in my practical reasoning all
this weekend, and I will freely adopt the vulnerabilities that result.”
I submit that if these reasons for entrusting the house became known to the
daughter, she could properly complain that the mother did not genuinely trust
her with the house. Notice that the case is crucially different from the version of
the mother-daughter case given as an example of non-doxastic trust in Section
5.1. In that case, we supposed that the mother was agnostic but willing, in
entrusting the house to the daughter, to take a risk on the daughter’s proving
trustworthy with the house, a risk she would no doubt have regretted taking
if the daughter had wrecked the house. In the present case, by contrast, the
mother preferred to entrust the house to the daughter regardless of whether the
daughter proved trustworthy (indeed, even though she believed the daughter
would not prove trustworthy).
The discussion here suggests an important general constraint on actions
that manifest the attitude of trust, a constraint that is not satisfied in cases of
mere entrusting. Actions that manifest trusting someone to φ involve taking a
particular kind of practical risk on someone’s proving trustworthy, a risk one
takes when one would prefer to perform the action if the person proves trustworthy to φ, but not otherwise. Thus, we have the following Risk Constraint
on Trust:
Risk Constraint on Trusting-to: An action involves A’s trusting
B to φ only if the action involves taking a practical risk on B’s proving
trustworthy to φ (that is, A prefers to perform the action if B proves
trustworthy to φ, but not otherwise).
Two points about the concept of practical risk at play in the Risk Constraint
will be germane to our discussion.26 First, this kind of risk is practical as
opposed to epistemic. One can take a practical risk on someone’s proving
trustworthy even if one is completely confident that the other will prove trustworthy. Indeed, one who is very confident will typically be willing to take very
big practical risks on the trusted’s proving trustworthy, performing actions
that would have disastrous consequences if the trusted fails to come through.
In another, epistemic sense, the trustor will not regard these actions as risky,
being fully confident that the trusted will not let her down. (Cf. [Pettit, 1995,
208])
Second, taking a practical risk in this sense requires more than merely
making oneself vulnerable to costs that would be incurred if the person fails
to prove trust-responsive. There is a natural but weaker sense in which Gandhi
risks being beaten when he puts a card in the fire, and the mother in Jones’
case risks damages to the house and to her reputation among the neighbors
26 In her account of faith, Lara Buchak argues that acting on faith that a proposition X
is true requires taking this kind of practical risk on X’s being true. Buchak gives a more
formal definition of taking a risk on the truth of a proposition: “[A]n act [A] constitutes an
individual’s taking a risk on X just in case for some alternative act B, A is preferred to
B under the supposition that X, and B is preferred to A under the supposition that X.”
[Buchak, 2014, 54]; cf. [Buchak, 2012].
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when she entrusts the house to the daughter. But neither takes a practical
risk in the stronger sense of performing an action that they prefer to do if
the entrusted proves trustworthy but not otherwise. Even on the supposition
that the person would fail to prove trustworthy, each still preferred, all things
considered, to perform the entrusting actions and suffer the consequences.
So far, our criticisms have not explicitly targetted the expectational version
of the Acceptance Account, according to which acceptance is compatible only
with agnosticism and not outright disbelief concerning whether someone will
prove trustworthy. Yet this theory, too, violates the Risk Constraint. To better
see this, consider another variation of the mother-daughter case. Suppose that
the mother is agnostic about whether the daughter will prove trustworthy but
entrusts the daughter with the house based solely on the following dominance
reasoning (which, according to all versions of the Acceptance Account, should
result in a long-term therapeutic case in which the mother trusts the daughter
with the house):
Mother: I am agnostic about whether my daughter will prove trustworthy with the house if I give it to her this weekend. But whether or
not she proves trustworthy, it would be better for me to trust her to
take care of the house. Maybe she will take good care of the house, and
if so, great. But if she wrecks the house, it will be good for her long-term
moral development if I trust her to care for it. (I will be able to point
out that she let me down even though I trusted her with the house,
and perhaps the regret she feels will make her more trustworthy in the
future.) It would be worth the cleanup, neighborhood complaints, etc.
to do this for her. So, I will accept (for purposes of practical reasoning
in this limited context), that she will take care of the house.
Again, if these reasons became known to the daughter, she could properly
complain that the mother was not genuinely trusting her with the house. The
mother decided to entrust the daughter with the house based on the idea that it
would be preferable to do so regardless of whether she proves trust-responsive.
Despite appearances, her entrusting the house did not involve taking the relevant kind of practical risk on the daughter to care for the house. Further, the
mother fails the counterfactual test that, in the case of the agnostic mother
from Section 5.1, served as evidence that she entrusted the house because she
trusted the daughter to care for it. She could not honestly claim, “If I had not
trusted you to take care of the house, I wouldn’t have given it to you;” she
would have given the house regardless of how much she trusted the daughter
to care for it.27
27

Might this be a case of overdetermination, in which the mother entrusted her daughter
both because of the dominance reasoning but also because she trusted her to care for the
house? In some cases this may be plausible, but not all. We can stipulate that the mother
in this case suffers from weakness of will, so that she would not be willing to give the house
to the daughter if it meant taking even a slight practical risk. In such a case her entrusting
the house clearly does not manifest trust, although the Acceptance Account implies that it
does.
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None of this is intended to disparage either the mother’s parenting in these
cases or the important role that the second line of trust might play in educating
for trust-responsiveness. As with the Gandhi case, we can distinguish first and
second line of trust hypotheses intended to explain why the mother entrusted
the daughter with the house:
First Line of Trust Hypothesis: The mother entrusted the daughter with
the house because she trusted her to take proper care of the house.
Second Line of Trust Hypothesis: The mother entrusted the daughter
with the house because she trusted her to one day become the sort of
person who can properly be trusted to take care of the house, if given
the right moral opportunities.
The first line of trust hypothesis must be true in order for the mother to
count as trusting the daughter with the house, and I’ve argued that it is false
in Jones’ case and the one just considered. However, the second line of trust
hypotheses is, arguably, true and important in these cases. It’s plausible to
suppose that, in entrusting the house to the daughter, the mother was trusting
the daughter to one day become someone who can be trusted with the house,
taking a practical risk on the daughter’s moral development that satisfies the
Risk Constraint’s condition for manifesting the second line of trust.
Further, even if it is common knowledge that the mother does not trust
the daughter with the house but merely entrusts her with it, the second line of
trust manisted in her entrusting may yet inspire in a way that passes Baier’s
expressibility test. One can imagine the mother forthrightly explaining her
reasons for entrusting the house and the daughter responding positively.
(In the Hallmark movie ending to this version of the case, the daughter
later expresses her gratitude:
Daughter: “I know that you did not really trust me to take good care
of the house. But I appreciate that you entrusted me with the house
anyway, because you trusted me to one day become the sort of person
who is trustworthy. Your trust inspired me. Thanks Mom.”)
However, notice two points about the mother’s second line of trust. First,
the second line of trust plausibly involves a belief or high confidence in the
daughter to one day become the sort of person who is trustworthy; it is doubtful
that non-doxastic trust would have these inspirational effects. Second, the
mother’s second line of trust is not a case of long-term therapeutic trust. To
construe it as a case of therapeutic trust requires adding the stipulation that
the mother trusted her daughter to one day become trustworthy in order to
inspire her to one day become trustworthy. But adding the stipulation would
make this a self-fulfilling prophecy type of case. Thus, we do not here have a
vindication of the possibility of long-term therapeutic trust.
6 Trust as Confidence-Enough-To-Risk
We have criticized the Adopted Vulnerabilities and Acceptance Accounts of
trust on the grounds that neither does justice to the Risk Constraint on Trust.
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Trusting requires being willing to take practical risks on someone’s proving
trustworthy, acting in ways one prefers to act if the trusted proves trustworthy,
but not otherwise. In our defense of nondoxastic trust (Section 5.1), we noted
that it is possible to be agnostic about someone’s proving trustworthy and yet
trust the person enough to take salient risks on their doing so. However, in the
limiting case in which placing something into someone’s care does not involve
taking a practical risk (because one would prefer to give it whether or not they
prove trustworthy), entrusting the person does not manifest trust.
A more promising account identifies trust with having a confidence sufficient to motivate one to take salient practical risks on someone’s proving
trust-responsive. On such a view, the attitude of trust consists in having confidence in someone to prove trustworthy, and such confidence might in some
cases fall short of outright belief. What it must do, however, is ground a willingness on the part of the trustor to take some practical risks on the trusted’s
proving trustworthy.28
On this view, in order for your entrusting someone with X to count as
trusting them with X, two conditions must be met. First, entrusting X must
satisfy the Risk Constraint; it must be an action that you prefer to take if the
trusted proves trustworthy to care properly for X, but not otherwise. Second,
your confidence in the person to properly care for X must be sufficient to
motivate you to take the risk of entrusting X. More generally, we can give the
following account of actions that manifest trust in someone to φ:
Confident-Enough-To-Risk Account of Trusting: An action
involves A trusting B to φ only if a) the action involves taking a practical risk on B’s proving trustworthy to φ (that is, A prefers to perform
the action if B proves trustworthy to φ, but not otherwise); and b) A
performs the action because she is confident enough that B will prove
trustworthy to φ.29
The account suggests that there are two distinct kinds of reasons for trusting: confidence-boosting and licensing reasons. Confidence-boosting reasons
are reasons that should rationally lead one to become more confident that the
trusted will prove trustworthy. The central kind of confidence-boosting reason
involves evidence of trust-responsiveness. Such evidence not only makes it epistemically rational to raise one’s confidence, it also makes it practically rational
to take greater risks on the person’s trustworthiness. If the considerations of
Section 4 are correct, some self-fulfilling prophecy cases of therapeutic trust
may involve a distinct, non-evidential kind of confidence-boosting reason. One
28 Recall from Section 2.3 that cases of trusting differ from cases of merely relying in
that they involve some kind of expectation that the person will not just φ but will prove
trustworthy in doing so. As I see it, this expectation is part of the content of the confidence
one has when one trusts, although it may be possible to develop a view that separates out
one’s confidence that someone will φ and further attitudes that constitute an expectation
that they will prove trustworthy in doing so. Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting
me to clarify this.
29 See [Gambetta, 1988] for an early account that identifies trust with being confident
enough to take risks.
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can rationally boost one’s confidence in someone to prove trustworthy to φ
based on reasons to think that one’s trust in them would make it more likely
that they will prove trustworthy.
Licensing reasons, by contrast, are considerations that suggest that the
likelihood of someone’s proving trustworthy is enough to motivate taking certain risks on their proving trustworthy.30 Licensing reasons do not rationally
boost one’s confidence that someone will prove trustworthy; rather, they suggest that the confidence one already has is sufficient to license taking practical
risks on the person’s doing so.
The account fits well with the common observation that trust seems to
depend on the potential cost of misplaced trust in one’s practical context. As
Frost-Arnold points out,
I may trust my friend not to tell my secret when exposure would do me
little harm, while not trusting her with the same secret in an environment where revelation would seriously damage my reputation. [FrostArnold, 2014, 1966]
In a similar vein, Katherine Hawley suggests that deliberating about whether
to trust depends on practical stakes, with more evidence of trustworthiness
required when misplaced trust would not be so costly:
Can you trust the newspaper’s claim that the weather will be sunny
all week? Yes, if you’re just trying to decide whether to hang out the
washing to dry. No, if you’re deciding whether to take out insurance for
an expensive outdoor wedding....When the stakes are low, we don’t need
much evidence; when there’s more at stake, we need more. [Hawley,
2012, 5]
One type of licensing reason, suggested by these examples, will involve considerations that show that in one’s practical context there is less practical
risk to trusting, because the cost of misplaced trust would be less than one
initially thought. Circumstances might change so that one now knows that
one’s secret, even if exposed, will not damage one’s reputation as much as
one initially thought. Or, riffing on Holton’s shopkeeper example, you might
learn that there is less money in the till than you first thought. Whereas your
confidence in the employee not to steal might not be great enough for you to
be willing to risk $10,000, it might be enough now that you know there is only
$100 there. This consideration might lead you to trust the employee with the
till without increasing your confidence in the employee.
Notice that the licensing reasons in these cases do not strengthen trust.
Rather, they suggests that the strength of trust one already has is sufficient
for taking the risk. For our purposes, this point has two important consequences. First, it allows us to see how licensing reasons of this sort can be
non-evidential while not running afoul of the wrong kind of reasons challenge
for strength of trust. One might accept the Evidence-Only Thesis for Strength
30 I borrow the term from Adrienne Martin [2013], who employs the term in her discussion
of reasons for hope.
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of Trust, holding that only evidence of trust-responsiveness can serve as reasons that strengthen trust, while still holding that one can trust based in part
on licensing reasons.
Second, although licensing reasons challenge the view that only evidence
can serve as reasons for trust, they also cast doubt on whether there are
rational cases of long-term therapeutic trust. For, if the long-term therapeutic
thought is to serve as a licensing reason, it will do so by showing that trusting
someone is less risky than one might have thought. The long-term therapeutic
thought might lead one to expect that the short-term costs associated with
misplaced trust would be compensated by a long-term good that the trustor
values: the trusted’s developing greater trust-responsiveness. The overall cost
of misplaced trust to the trustor will thus be less. (In the counterexamples
we presented to the Adopted Vulnerabilities and Acceptance Accounts, the
considerations show that entrusting someone with something of value would
be preferable even if the person fails to prove trustworthy, and so does not
require any degree of trust.)
The problem is that these considerations threaten to shortcircuit the mechanisms by which trust might reasonably be expected to inspire greater trustworthiness, lessening the encouragement and esteem that could sincerely be
conveyed by one’s trust. Both the encouragement and esteem mechanisms
work by conveying something about one’s confidence—either that one has
a confident belief that the trusted will prove trustworthy, or that one is at
least confident enough to take a serious practical risk on the trusted’s proving
trust-responsive. To the extent that one’s entrusting is motivated by a desire
to produce long-term therapeutic effects, though, the act of entrusting will not
manifest the strength of trust that one had hoped would inspire.
Again, this is not to say that there are never therapeutic goods associated
with entrusting someone with X when one does not trust them with X. As
we saw above, the daughter in Jones’ case might be inspired by the second
line of trust that the mother manifests in entrusting the house to her. Further,
the daughter might draw moral inspiration from the mother’s willingness to
sacrifice her own self-interest for the sake of the daughter’s moral good. The
mother’s entrusting displays an admirable ordering of values, which places
the daughter’s long-term moral development above being able to avoid the
inconveniences of a wrecked house. The daughter might, ironically, be inspired
by the idea that the mother did not regard entrusting her with the house
as involving a big practical risk and so did not regard the situation as one
requiring strong trust. This point, while true and important, suggest that
attitudes other than trust can have therapeutic effects, and an adequate moral
psychology should distinguish this source of moral inspiration from the very
different cases in which trust inspires.
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